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Abstract—X-codes form a special class of linear maps which
were originally introduced for data compression in VLSI testing
and are also known to give special parity-check matrices for
linear codes suitable for error-erasure channels. In the context
of circuit testing, an (m,n, d, x) X-code compresses n-bit output
data R from the circuit under test into m bits, while allowing for
detecting the existence of an up to d-bit-wise anomaly in R even
if up to x bits of the original uncompressed R are unknowable to
the tester. Using probabilistic combinatorics, we give a nontrivial
lower bound for any d ≥ 2 on the maximum number n of
codewords such that an (m,n, d, 2) X-code of constant weight
3 exists. This is the first result that shows the existence of an
infinite sequence of X-codes whose compaction ratio tends to
infinity for any fixed d under severe weight restrictions. We also
give a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that produces X-
codes that achieve our bound.
I. INTRODUCTION
Very-large-scale integration (VLSI) testing is vital part of
digital circuit production and aims to minimize the number of
defective circuits due to imperfect manufacturing processes.
In typical digital circuit testing, the tester applies test patterns
to the circuit under test and checks whether it outputs correct
responses. In short, VLSI testing aims to detect a discrepancy
between expected and observed responses of the circuit under
test.
While this type of simple comparison-based testing may
seem trivial to perform, it is not always an easy job. Indeed, the
ever growing complexity of modern VLSI circuits is making
the volume of required input and output patterns extremely
large, resulting in prohibitively long test time and unacceptably
large tester-memory requirements [1]. For this reason, various
cost reduction techniques, such as scan-based logic built-in
self-test (BIST) [2], have been developed to make modern
digital circuits testable [3].
One important development in test cost reduction is re-
sponse data compression, where a well-designed compactor
hashes the expected and observed responses from the circuit
under test in such a way that, if the original observed data
contain unexpected bits signaling a defect, the compressed
versions of expected and observed responses also exhibit
discrepancies [4]. With this method, the amount of data we
should compare becomes smaller than if we naively compare
every actual output against the expected behavior bit by bit.
This idea of compressing responses is very similar to non-
adaptive group testing such as pooling designs for DNA library
screening [5]. However, there is a key difference between
group testing in bioinformatics and test compression for VLSI
circuits, which is the existence of unknowable bits, called Xs,
in the case of VLSI testing.
Ideally, the tester would like to perfectly predict the behav-
ior of a non-defective circuit for any input pattern. However,
this is not the case in general with a complex modern circuit
due to various factors such as uninitialized memory elements,
bus contention, floating triple-states, and imperfect simulations
[3]. Thus, the data to be compressed during circuit testing may
contain Xs, that is, logic values that are unknowable to the
tester beforehand, complicating the otherwise classic coding-
theoretic problem of hashing a pair of data sets while avoiding
collisions if they differ.
X-compact [6], [7] is a simple method to hash responses
while maintaining test quality even in the presence of Xs. A
response data compactor for X-compact is called an X-code
and restricted to a linear map [8]. In the language of VLSI
testing, an (m,n, d, x) X-code compresses n-bit output from
the circuit under test into m bits while allowing for detecting
the existence of up to d-bit-wise discrepancies between the
observed and correct responses even if up to x bits of the
correct behavior are unknowable. Hence, all else being equal,
given d and x, X-codes of higher compaction ratio n
m
are
desirable. It is notable that X-codes are also known to be
useful for error-erasure separation in coding theory [9], where
achieving larger n for given m, d, and x is again desirable.
Because X-codes are linear maps, we may regard an
(m,n, d, x) X-code as a well-designed m× n matrix H over
the finite field F2 of order 2 that compresses n-dimensional
vectors a ∈ Fn2 into the correspondingm-dimensional vectors
HaT ∈ Fm2 . When seen this way, desirable X-codes are those
with more columns and fewer rows that achieve a higher
compaction ratio.
The ability to detect discrepancies and high compaction ra-
tio are not the only required properties, however. For practical
reasons such as power requirements, compactor delay, and
wirability, it is also desirable for the number of 1s in each
column to be as small as possible [6], [10]. However, a column
of weight less that or equal to x in an (m,n, d, x) X-code
makes no essential contribution to the achievable compaction
ratio [8], [11]. Hence, our focus will be on X-codes with the
largest possible number Mx+1(m, d, x) of columns for given
numberm of rows and other two test quality parameters d and
x under the condition that the column weights are all restricted
to x+ 1, namely optimal X-codes of constant weight x+ 1.
The simplest case is when x = 1, where the compactor
is only required to tolerate a single X . In this case, an
(m,n, d, 1) X-code of constant weight 2 can be shown to be
equivalent to a graph of girth d+2 in graph theory [10]. More
details on X-codes of constant weight 2 and their connection
to graph theory can be found in [10] and references therein.
While tolerance of a single X is sufficient in some cases,
multiple Xs can occur in practice. Unfortunately, our knowl-
edge on X-codes of constant weight x+ 1 for x ≥ 2 is quite
limited. As we will briefly review in the next section, even
for the next simplest case of x = 2, the precise asymptotic
behavior of M3(m, d, 2) is only known for d = 1, which is
M3(m, 1, 2) = Θ(m
2) [11]. For larger d, as far as the authors
are aware, the only non-trivial result is an upper bound, which
states that M3(m, d, 2) = o(m
2) for d ≥ 4, proved by using
a tool from extremal graph theory [12]. While this bound
suggests that the asymptotic behavior of M3(m, d, 2) is not
so simple, whether Mx+1(m, d, x) can be superlinear for any
fixed d and x has remained an open problem.
Here, we make a substantial step towards understanding the
asymptotic behavior of M3(m, d, 2) by proving the existence
of an infinite sequence of (m,n, d, 2) X-codes of constant
weight 3 whose compaction ratio tends to infinity for any d.
Theorem 1.1: For any positive integer m,
M3(m, d, 2) =


Ω(m
4
3 ) for d = 2,
Ω(m
5
4 ) for d = 3,
Ω(m
6
5 ) for d ≥ 4.
We first give a short and nonconstructive proof based on
probabilistic combinatorics and then provide a deterministic
polynomial-time algorithm that produces X-codes that achieve
the above lower bound.
In Section II, we briefly review the basic properties of X-
codes and known results. Section III gives our new bound
on M3(m, d, 2) as well as a deterministic algorithm for
constructing X-codes attaining this bound that runs in time
polynomial in m for fixed d. Section IV concludes this paper
with some remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Here, we give a formal mathematical definition of X-codes.
Basic facts and known results are also briefly reviewed.
Let m, and n be positive integers. The superimposed
sum of two binary columns a = (a1, a2, . . . , am)
T , b =
(b1, b2, . . . , bm)
T ∈ Fm2 is defined to be a
∨
b = (a1∨b1, a2∨
b2, . . . , am ∨ bm)
T , where ai ∨ bi = 0 if ai = bi = 0 and
1 otherwise. The addition of a + b between two columns
a, b ∈ Fm2 is assumed to be the coordinatewise sum over F2
as usual. A binary column a is said to be contained in another
binary column b if a
∨
b = b.
For positive integer d and non-negative integer x, an m×n
binary matrix H is an (m,n, d, x) X-code if the superimposed
sum of any x columns does not contain the addition of any
other up to d columns. The columns of an X-code are the
codewords, while the number of rows is the length.
By definition, an (m,n, d, x) X-code with d ≥ 2 is an
(m,n, d− 1, x) X-code. For d ≥ 2 and x ≥ 1, an (m,n, d, x)
X-code is also an (m,n, d+ 1, x− 1) X-code [8].
It is notable that the definition of an (m,n, 1, x) X-code
coincides with that of an x-disjunct matrix [13] of size
m × n for group testing. Disjunct matrices are also known
as cover-free families [14] and superimposed codes [15]. An
(m,n, d, 0) X-code forms a parity-check matrix for a linear
code of length n, dimension at least n − m, and minimum
distance at least d+1. For x ≥ 1, an (m,n, d, x) X-code can
be seen as a special parity-check matrix that can treat errors
and erasures separately over an error-erasure channel [9].
Now, to see how X-codes work in VLSI testing, let us
consider the following (4, 6, 1, 1) X-code H .
H =


1 0 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 1

 .
Assume that a and b are 6-dimensional vectors over {0, 1, X}
that represent the observed and expected responses from
the circuit under test, respectively. Because X represents an
unknowable logic value, computation involving X is defined
by a + X = X + a = X, 0 · X = X · 0 = 0, and
1 · X = X · 1 = X. VLSI testing with the X-code H
compares 4-dimensional vectors HaT and HbT instead of a
and b. The property of H as a (4, 6, 1, 1) X-code guarantees
that a discrepancy of no more than one bit between the
actual output a and the correct output b can be detected by
comparing the shrunk responses a and b even if up to 1 bit
of the correct behavior is unknowable. For example, when
a = (0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0) and b = (X, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0), the shrunk
responses are HaT = (0, 1, 0, 1)T and HbT = (X,X, 1, 1)T .
As can be seen easily, there exists a discrepancy between the
last bits of HaT and HbT , so that we can find the circuit
under test is defective.
As a linear function for compaction, all else being equal, it
is desirable for an (m,n, d, x) X-code to have as large n as
possible for given m, d, and x. Recall that Mx+1(m, d, x) is
the maximum number n for which there exists an (m,n, d, x)
X-code of constant weight x + 1. For d = 1 and x = 2, it is
known that
M3(m, 1, 2) ≤
m(m− 1)
6
with equality if and only if m ≡ 1, 3 (mod 6) [11]. Because
M3(m, d, 2) ≤ M3(m, 1, 2) by definition, the above upper
bound holds for all d ≥ 2 as well. While the above inequality
says that M3(m, 1, 2) = Θ(m
2), it is also known that
M3(m, d, 2) = o(m
2) for any d ≥ 4 [12]. Therefore, we have
the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1 ( [11], [12]): It holds that
M3(m, d, 2) =


Θ(m2) for d = 1,
O(m2) for d = 2, 3,
o(m2) for d ≥ 4.
Although an attempt has been made to construct matrices
similar to (m,n, d, 2) X-codes of constant weight 3 for large
d in [12], to the best of the authors’ knowledge, no nontrivial
lower bounds on M3(m, d, 2) are known for d ≥ 2.
III. MAIN RESULTS
This section is divided into two subsections. In Section
III-A, we derive a general lower bound on M3(m, d, 2) by
using the probabilistic method in combinatorics [16]. Section
III-B derandomizes the probabilistic proof to demonstrate that
an (m,n, d, 2) X-code of constant weight 3 which attains the
derived lower bound can be constructed deterministically in
time polynomial in m.
A. General lower bound on M3(m, d, 2)
Here, we prove the following general asymptotic bound.
Theorem 3.1: For sufficiently large m, it holds that
M3(m, d, 2) ≥


αm
4
3 for d = 2,
βm
5
4 for d = 3,
γm
6
5 for d ≥ 4,
where
α =
1
4
(
1
1749
) 1
3
; 2.07× 10−2,
β =
4
(15)
3
4 (378131)
1
4
; 2.12× 10−2, and
γ =
5
3
(
5
10606681
) 1
5
6−
4
5 ; 2.16× 10−2.
Note that Theorem 1.1 immediately follows from this bound.
To prove the above theorem, we will first show the following
two lemmas.
Lemma 3.2: For sufficiently large m, there exists an
(m, cm
4
3 , 2, 2) X-code of constant weight 3 with c =
1
4 (
1
1749 )
1
3 ; 2.07× 10−2.
Lemma 3.3: For any d ≥ 3 and any p ∈ [0, 1], there exists
an (m,N(m, d, p), d, 2) X-code of constant weight 3, where
N(m, d, p) =
(
m
3
)
p−
((
m
6
)((6
3
)
3
)
p3 +
(
m
8
)((8
3
)
4
)
p4
+
d∑
i=3
(
m
6 + ⌈ 3i−12 ⌉
)((6+⌈ 3i−1
2
⌉
3
)
i+ 2
)
pi+2
)
.
To show these lemmas, we employ a well-known class of
combinatorial designs. A set system of order v is an ordered
pair (V,B) such that V is a finite set of points with |V | = v
and B is a family of subsets of V , called blocks. The point-
by-block incidence matrix of a set system (V,B) is the binary
|V | × |B| matrix H = (hi,j) such that rows and columns
are indexed by points and blocks, respectively, and hi,j = 1
if the ith point is contained in the jth block and hi,j = 0
otherwise. For a subset B′ of B, the odd-point union U of B′
is defined to be U = {a ∈ V | |{B ∈ B′ | a ∈ B}| is odd}.
It is straightforward to see that an (m,n, d, x) X-code whose
rows and columns are indexed by V and B, respectively, is
equivalent to a set system (V,B) of order m with |B| = n
such that no union of x blocks contains the odd-point union
of any other d or fewer blocks as a subset. We denote by
(
V
3
)
the set of 3-subsets, called triples, of V .
X-codes of constant weight 3 can be characterized by some
subsets of
(
V
3
)
. A configuration in a set system (V,B) is a
subset C of B. When |C| = i, a configuration C is an i-
configuration. A configuration is (d, x)-forbidden if it appears
in no (m,n, d, x) X-codes of constant weight 3. We denote by
CV,d,x the set of (d, x)-forbidden configurations on the point
set V . For instance, for {a, b, c, d} ⊆ V , a 3-configuration
C = {{a, b, c}, {b, c, d}, {a, b, d}} is (1, 2)-forbidden, that is,
C ∈ CV,1,2, because the union {a, b, c, d} = {a, b, c}∪{b, c, d}
contains {a, b, d} as a subset, making it impossible to appear
in an (m,n, 1, 2) X-code on the point set V .
The probabilistic proof of Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 relies on the
fact that it is enough to show the existence of a set system
that avoids all (d, 2)-forbidden configurations. The set CV,d,2
of (d, 2)-forbidden configurations can be partitioned into the
following sets of configurations:
CV,d,2 =
⋃
3≤i≤d+2
CV,d,2(i),
where CV,d,2(i) is the set of i-configurations that are (d, 2)-
forbidden. Note that CV,d,2(1) and CV,d,2(2) are empty sets
since the set system (V,
(
V
3
)
) consists of distinct triples.
Proof of Lemma 3.2: Let V = {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Take a set
B of triples by picking elements of
(
V
3
)
uniformly at random
with probability p. Let X = |{C ∈ CV,2,2 | C ⊆ B}| be the
random variable that counts the number of (2, 2)-forbidden
configurations in B. Note that because discarding a triple T
in B removes the configuration containing T , deleting at most
one triple from each (2, 2)-forbidden configuration in B gives
an (m,n, 2, 2) X-code with n ≥ |B| − X . Therefore, there
exists an (m,n, 2, 2) X-code with n ≥ E(|B| −X).
Let D3 be the set of 3-configurations in (V,
(
V
3
)
) that
consists of 6 elements of V . Since every configuration in
(
V
3
)
consists of distinct triples, the largest number of elements of
V in a configuration in CV,2,2(3) is 6, that is, CV,2,2(3) ⊂
D3. Similarly, CV,2,2(4) ⊂ D4, where D4 is the set of 4-
configurations in (V,
(
V
3
)
) that consists of 8 elements of V .
Therefore, by linearity of expectation, we have
E(|B| −X)
= E(|B|)− E(X)
=
(
m
3
)
p−
4∑
i=3
|CV,2,2(i)|p
i
≥
(
m
3
)
p−
4∑
i=3
|Di|p
i
=(
m
3
)
p−
((
m
6
)((6
3
)
3
)
p3 +
(
m
8
)((8
3
)
4
)
p4
)
.
By setting p = 2( 11749 )
1
3m−
5
3 , the right-hand side of the above
inequality is 14 (
1
1749 )
1
3m
4
3 + f(m) with f(m) = o(m
4
3 ), as
desired.
It is notable that precisely counting the number of configu-
ration in CV,2,2(i) instead of Di can only give asymptotically
the same bound.
Lemma 3.3 can be obtained by essentially the same proba-
bilistic argument as in the proof of Lemma 3.2.
Proof of Lemma 3.3: Consider the random variable Y =
|{C ∈ CV,d,2 | C ∈ B}| that counts the number of (d, 2)-
forbidden configuration in B and follow the same argument
as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 to show the existence of an
(m,n, d, 2) X-code of constant weight 3 with n ≥ E(|B|−Y ).
Note that for any (i+2)-configuration C in CV,d,2(i+2) with
3 ≤ i ≤ d, it holds that∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
T∈C
T
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 6 +
⌈
3i− 1
2
⌉
,
where equality holds when i is even and C consists of
i triples A1, A2, B1, B2, . . . Bi such that |A1 ∪ A2| = 6,
(A1 ∪ A2) ∩ Bj = φ for any 1 ≤ j ≤ i, and each element
in the union
⋃
1≤j≤iBj is contained in exactly 2 triples of
{B1, B2, . . . , Bi}, or when i is odd and C consists of i
triples A′1, A
′
2, B
′
1, B
′
2, . . . B
′
i such that |A
′
1 ∪ A
′
2| = 6 and
there exists exactly one triple B in {B′1, . . . , B
′
i} such that
|(A′1∪A
′
2)∩B| = 1, and each element in the union
⋃
1≤j≤iB
′
j
except for an element in (A′1∪A
′
2)∩B is contained in exactly
2 triples of {B′1, B
′
2, . . . , B
′
i−2}. Therefore, by linearity of
expectation, we have
E(|B| − Y )
=
(
m
3
)
p−
d∑
i=1
|CV,d,2(i+ 2)|p
i+2
≥
(
m
3
)
p−
((
m
6
)((6
3
)
3
)
p3 +
(
m
8
)((8
3
)
4
)
p4
+
d∑
i=3
(
m
6 + ⌈ 3i−12 ⌉
)((6+⌈ 3i−1
2
⌉
3
)
i+ 2
)
pi+2
)
,
as desired.
Now, we prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: By Lemma 3.2, it holds
that M3(m, 2, 2) ≥ αm
4
3 , where α = 14 (
1
1749 )
1
3 . For
d = 3, by setting p = 2
(
15
378131
) 1
4 m−
7
4 to maximize
N(m, d, p), we have N(m, d, p) = βm
5
4 + g(m) with β =
4
(15)
3
4 (378131)
1
4
and g(m) = o(m
5
4 ). By Lemma 3.3, it holds
that M3(m, 3, 2) ≥ βm
5
4 . Similarly, for d ≥ 4, by setting
p = 2
(
30
10606681
) 1
5 m−
9
5 , we have N(m, d, p) = γm
6
5 +h(m)
with γ = 53
(
5
10606681
) 1
5 6−
4
5 and h(m) = o(m
6
5 ). By Lemma
3.3, for d ≥ 4 it holds that M3(m, d, 2) ≥ γm
6
5 , as desired.
B. Construction algorithm
To extract a deterministic algorithm from our probabilistic
proof in the previous section, we follow the approach of [12],
which uses the method of conditional expectations [16].
Let Ti, 1 ≤ i ≤
(
m
3
)
, be the triples in
(
V
3
)
in arbitrary
order. While the proof of Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 randomly picks
each triple in
(
V
3
)
, here we deterministically decide whether to
pick Ti one by one from T1 through T(m3 )
. Note that the picked
triples may contain some forbidden configurations in CV,d,2.
To remove the forbidden configurations, the final deletion
process is done the same way as in the probabilistic proof
by discarding at most one triple from each realized forbidden
configuration.
Now we describe our derandomized algorithm in detail. To
record our decision on whether we pick a triple at each step,
define ti = 1 if Ti is included and 0 otherwise. For a given
binary sequence t1 . . . ti of length i and forbidden configura-
tion C ∈ CV,d,2, define r = |{Tj ∈ C | tj = 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ i}|
and
s(C) =
{
p|C|−r if |{Tj ∈ C | tj = 0}| = 0,
0 otherwise.
Given the first i decisions t1 . . . ti on the triples, assume for
the moment that we pick each of remaining
(
m
3
)
− i triples
independently and uniformly at random with probability
p =


2( 11749 )
1
3m−
5
3 for d = 2,
2
(
15
378131
) 1
4 m−
7
4 for d = 3,
2
(
30
10606681
) 1
5 m−
9
5 for d ≥ 4.
This is equivalent to hypothetically regarding each tj for i+
1 ≤ j ≤
(
m
3
)
as an independent random variable such that
tj = 1 with probability p and 0 with probability 1− p.
Let B = {Tj | tj = 1, 1 ≤ j ≤
(
m
3
)
}, and define
X = {C ∈ CV,d,2 | C ⊆ B}. B and X represent the sets
of picked triples and formed forbidden configurations after
the hypothetical random sampling, respectively.
If we started with fixed i decisions t1, . . . , ti and performed
the random sampling for the remaining triples, the number
of triples after the deletion process would be at least the
conditional expectation
E(|B| − |X | | ti, . . . ti) =|{Tj | tj = 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ i}|
+
((
m
3
)
− i
)
p−
∑
C∈CV,d,2
s(C).
For b = 0, 1, define
E((t)i, ti+1=b) = E(|B| − |X | | ti, . . . ti, ti+1 = b),
which is the conditional expectation when the random variable
ti+1 is realized as b. When i = 0, we define
E((t)0, t1 = b) = E(|B| − |X | | t1 = b).
Since
E(|B| − |X | | ti, . . . ti)
= pE((t)i, ti+1=1) + (1 − p)E((t)i, ti+1=0),
it holds that
E(|B| − |X | | ti, . . . ti)
≤ max{E((t)i, ti+1=1), E((t)i, ti+1=0)}.
Therefore, by starting from no decisions on the triples and
picking Ti at the ith step if and only if E((t)i, ti+1=1) >
E((t)i, ti+1=0), we end up with at least E(|B| − |X |) triples
after the deletion process, which is precisely the guaranteed
number of codewords of an X-code by Theorem 3.1. Algo-
rithm 1 describes the above deterministic procedure.
Algorithm 1 Derandomized algorithm for Theorem 3.1
Input: Point set V of cardinality m
Output: (m, |B|, d, 2) X-code (V,B) of constant weight 3
1: B ← φ
2: Fix the order of {T1, T2, . . . T(m3 )
} =
(
V
3
)
arbitrarily
3: CV,d,2 ← set of all forbidden configurations in
(
V
3
)
4: for i = 1 to
(
m
3
)
do
5: if (E((t)i−1, ti = 1) > E((t)i−1, ti = 0)) then
6: B ← B ∪ {Ti}
7: ti ← 1
8: else
9: ti ← 0
10: end if
11: end for
12: while ∃C ∈ CV,d,2 s.t. C ⊂ B do
13: B ← B \ {T }, where T is an arbitrary triple in C
14: end while
15: return (V,B)
In the remainder of this section, we show that Algorithm 1
runs in time polynomial in m. Our analysis here is quite rough
but enough to show that it is efficient in a technical sense.
First, note that listing all forbidden configurations in
CV,d,2 only takes time polynomial in m because |CV,d,2| =
O(m6+⌈
3d−1
2
⌉). The steps for picking triples require comput-
ing two conditional expectations
(
m
3
)
times each. Since com-
puting a conditional expectation takes at mostO(|CV,d,2|) time,
the steps for picking triples can be done in O(m9+⌈
3d−1
2
⌉).
Checking whether a given triple is contained in B takes
O(log |B|) time by using the binary search. Therefore, the
complexity of the final deletion process is bounded from above
by |CV,d,2| log
(
m
3
)
. Hence, the total run time will not exceed
O(m9+⌈
3d−1
2
⌉), as required.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have derived a lower bound on the maximum number n
for which an (m,n, d, 2) X-code of constant weight 3 exists.
This is the first nontrivial lower bound on M3(m, d, 2) for
general d and demonstrates that constant-weight X-codes can
substantially reduce the amount of response data under the
presence of a multi-bit discrepancy, multiple unknowable bits,
and a severe constraint on fan-out (see [11] and references
therein for the background on the fan-out issue).
We have also proved that such X-codes can be constructed
deterministically in time polynomial in m. This was done by
first proving their existence through a probabilistic argument
and then derandomizing it by the method of conditional
expectations. It is notable that this approach was also shown
effective in [12] for a more specific situation where multiple
Xs are rather rare but do occur. It would be interesting to see
how widely this approach can be applied to similar problems.
Finally, it should be noted that while we have made nontriv-
ial progress towards understanding the asymptotic behavior of
M3(m, d, 2), there still remains a substantial gap between the
sharpest upper and lower bounds on M3(m, d, 2). In fact, for
general d and x, the problem of determiningMx+1(m, d, x) is
nearly completely open. We hope that future work addresses
these challenging areas.
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